

Program Coordination, PSB

Preliminary to a discussion of the necessity of "program" coordination by the PSB, it is desirable to delineate the distinction between national policy and the means by which that policy is carried out. Policy is the over-all aim of the nation with respect to other powers. It assumes many variations, including isolationism, neutralism, appeasement, collective security (alliances, federations), intervention, prevention of war, balance of power, etc. Any of the above policies might be selected to attain the national objective, whether it be survival, peace, or expansion.

The policy itself is implemented through four primary forces: (1) Political; (2) Military; (3) Economic; and (4) Propaganda. These forces have always been the prime-movers of international relations.

In American history, these have been customarily applied in a hit-or-miss uncoordinated fashion. But twentieth century totalitarianism has produced a revolution in the standard practices of international relations. Soviet foreign policy, for example, is a combination of political, military, economic, and propaganda warfare which cannot be isolated into separate functions. The Soviets have also introduced the concept of "neither war nor peace"—what we have come to know as the "cold war." One of the disquieting features of Soviet cold war strategy is that political, economic, and propaganda campaigns proceed and often obviate the necessity of military campaigns. The Soviets consider the standard forces available for one nation to impose its will upon another merely as a variety of means which can be utilized to obtain a given objective.

The Soviets have accepted subjection of the enemy will as the primary aim of warfare. Consequently, they have always given the highest place to the psychological element in this struggle for power. Up until recently we have sought to keep Soviet aggression at bay with either economic or military aid programs, or in the case of Korea, open warfare. We have mostly overlooked the fact that the essence of this struggle is psychological.

The PSB has been created to think and act in the intangible "no man's land" of psychological activity which lies between and above specific undertakings in either the political, military, economic, or propaganda field.

The creation of the PSB resulted from a recognition of the fact that the Act creating the NSC did not provide specifically for any top-level coordination and supervision other than by the President

himself

himself of the operational programs required to carry out the policies established at the national level.

Although several departments and agencies of the Government have a primary interest in the four major fields by which policies are implemented, they also have a secondary -- and quite significant -- interest in one or more of the other fields. This interest has, in general, been recognized and efforts have been made to coordinate the operations of the various departments which impinge upon the cold war. These efforts have been based on the erroneous assumption that the mere addition of the activities being undertaken by the various departments within a given field of activity express the sum total of all the activity which should, or could, be undertaken to assure the most effective implementation of national policy. Actually, this is not the case. Within any one of the four major fields there are gaps and duplications which decrease the effectiveness of the program being conducted within that field. It has always been, as it will be, impossible for departmental representatives to see the inadequacy of a total program from the viewpoint of a single department. These inadequacies can be seen and improvements proposed only by individuals who regard the separate departmental elements of a given program from an over-all point of view.

Statement of Forces

1. Political. Diplomacy is the primary tool by which political forces are applied by one nation upon another. Diplomacy is a major function of the Department of State (the formulation of policy is the primary function of the Department of State). Other agencies, however, conduct activity which is political in nature and which should be coordinated within the framework of an over-all plan of political action. For example, the NSA ambassador in Europe in the performance of his function has often been directly involved in political activity in the broad sense. Likewise, General Eisenhower, SACBIR, our diplomat in uniform, has had to concern himself with political as well as military affairs. Military missions, likewise, have political significance. Political warfare which is a direct secret intervention into the domestic politics of a foreign country, likewise, belongs in the larger framework of political force. Needless to say, the commercial activities of American firms, such as airlines, oil companies, etc., have political consequences in the strictest sense of the word.

2. Military. The Department of Defense has primary cognizance of the force element in international relations. Yet it does not have exclusive sovereignty. The preparations and, at times, the conduct of paramilitary activity may have a direct bearing on the over-all military situation. Similarly, the military situation can be

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altered by psychological and economic action outside of the direct competence of the Department of Defense. Promotion of effective alliances, an essential element of a total military program, can only be accomplished by the most careful support of all the other means by which pressures are applied on other nations.

3. Propaganda. As of the moment, at least four agencies in the Government are engaged in purely propaganda activities, i.e., State, Defense, CIA, and NSA. Propaganda as distinguished from psychological warfare refers to the planned use of communications in order to influence actions. A mechanism now exists for coordinating purely propaganda activities of these agencies. So far, this mechanism, the POCG, has not created an over-all propaganda plan, nor utilized all the propaganda machinery within the Government. It, likewise, has lacked the authority to suggest and to coordinate means by which conditions most appropriate for propaganda exploitation could be created. In other words, it has not been able to suggest successful concrete actions to provide the springboard from which all good propaganda is mounted.

4. Economic. Although the exact competence of the PSB with respect to economic activities has yet to be delineated, it should be obvious that the impact of American economic relations with the rest of the world should be coordinated for the purpose of psychological exploitation with the other major activities through which national policies are executed. (A separate paper is being written on this problem.) It is appropriate to suggest here, however, that since economic betterment is the primary propaganda justification of the whole scheme of Soviet aggrandizement, that the psychological implications of the economic programs being conducted by ECA, Munitions Board, IDAP, etc., are of significant interest to the PSB.